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Abstract
This	  arDcle	  tells	  the	  story	  of	  an	  agreement	  that	  never	  took	  place.	  It	  is	  the	  story	  of	  a	  loan	  that	  both	  
the	  borrower	  (Italy)	  and	  the	  lender	  (the	  InternaDonal	  Bank	  for	  ReconstrucDon	  and	  Development,	  
aka	  the	  World	  Bank)	  had	  seriously	  pursued,	  but	  came	  to	  a	  halt	  shortly	  before	  being	  ﬁnalized.	  As	  
paradoxical	  as	  it	  may	  sound,	  this	  story	  (or	  lack	  thereof)	  is	  the	  ideal	  starDng	  point	  to	  examine	  the	  
subsequent	  long-­‐lasDng	  and	  fruiTul	  relaDon	  between	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  Italy	  in	  the	  years	  
1951-­‐1965,	  because	  all	  the	  salient	  elements	  that	  would	  characterize	  that	  relaDon	  were	  born	  –	  
again,	  paradoxically	  –	  out	  of	  this	  loan	  interruptus.
Italy’s	  decision	  to	  apply	  for	  membership	  in	  the	  BreYon	  Woods	  insDtuDons	  –	  the	  InternaDonal	  
Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF)	  and	  the	  InternaDonal	  Bank	  for	  ReconstrucDon	  and	  Development	  (IBRD)	  –	  
was	  made	  	  immediately	  aZer	  World	  War	  II.	  The	  senior	  management	  of	  Banca	  d’Italia,	  the	  Italian	  
Central	  Bank,	  and	  the	  Italian	  government	  pursued	  this	  goal	  with	  determinaDon,	  as	  they	  saw	  it	  as	  
a	  necessary	  step	  toward	  the	  reconstrucDon	  of	  Italy’s	  poliDcal	  and	  economic	  relaDons	  with	  Allied	  
countries.	  For	  Italy,	  in	  addiDon	  to	  economic	  consideraDons,	  the	  most	  desirable	  aspect	  of	  its	  
BreYon	  Woods	  membership	  was	  primarily	  poliDcal:	  it	  was	  supposed	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  
collaboraDve	  approach	  and	  goodwill	  in	  Italy’s	  internaDonal	  relaDons	  aZer	  the	  authoritarian,	  
warmongering,	  and	  autarchic	  policies	  pursued	  by	  the	  Fascist	  government.
The	  Marshall	  Plan,	  because	  of	  its	  unprecedented	  scale,	  its	  call	  for	  European	  coordinaDon	  and	  its	  
character	  of	  reacDon	  to	  the	  worsening	  internaDonal	  situaDon,	  was	  a	  major	  novelty	  and	  a	  
fundamental	  turning	  point	  in	  the	  construcDon	  of	  postwar	  Europe.	  For	  the	  InternaDonal	  Bank,	  
the	  Marshall	  Plan	  is	  considered	  a	  turning	  point,	  as	  from	  its	  incepDon,	  the	  Bank	  abandoned	  
European	  reconstrucDon	  and	  embraced	  the	  mission	  of	  Third	  World	  development.	  The	  eﬀect	  on	  
the	  Bank’s	  loan	  policies	  was	  a	  shiZ	  from	  short-­‐term	  reconstrucDon	  projects	  to	  longer-­‐term	  
development	  ones.	  Implicitly	  or	  explicitly,	  several	  studies	  underscore	  the	  transiDon	  of	  the	  
InternaDonal	  Bank	  from	  reconstrucDon	  to	  development,	  and	  especially	  the	  disconDnuity	  
between	  these	  two	  phases.
Evident	  and	  unquesDonable	  though	  the	  transiDon	  is,	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  its	  character	  of	  
disconDnuity	  does	  not	  show	  a	  complete	  picture	  of	  the	  story.	  As	  a	  maYer	  of	  fact,	  important	  
elements	  of	  the	  development	  policies	  that	  the	  InternaDonal	  Bank	  would	  adopt	  aZer	  the	  Marshall	  
Plan	  had	  already	  emerged	  in	  the	  negoDaDons	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  Italy	  before	  the	  Marshall	  
Plan.	  The	  Marshall	  Plan	  was	  obviously	  a	  catalyst	  and	  acDvely	  encouraged	  the	  shiZ	  of	  the	  
InternaDonal	  Bank	  from	  reconstrucDon	  to	  development.	  As	  a	  maYer	  of	  fact,	  the	  early	  
negoDaDons	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  Italy	  did	  not	  result	  in	  a	  loan;	  the	  ﬁrst	  loan	  would	  be	  signed	  
only	  in	  1951.	  This	  certainly	  inﬂuenced	  the	  usual	  conclusion	  that	  Bank-­‐Italy	  relaDons	  were	  
modiﬁed	  by	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Marshall	  Plan.	  Yet,	  those	  early	  negoDaDons	  were	  brought	  to	  a	  halt	  
only	  because	  Italy	  so	  decided	  and,	  when	  they	  were	  resumed,	  they	  incorporated	  several	  
important	  elements	  already	  discussed	  in	  the	  early	  phase.	  The	  “development	  Bank,”	  as	  opposed	  
to	  the	  “reconstrucDon	  Bank,”	  was	  obviously	  not	  a	  completely	  new	  insDtuDon	  endowed	  with	  a	  
fully	  new	  set	  of	  policies.	  The	  conDnuity	  is	  especially	  evident	  in	  the	  importance	  assigned	  to	  
balance	  of	  payments	  issues,	  a	  macroeconomic	  approach,	  the	  mechanisms	  designed	  for	  the	  
disbursement	  of	  the	  loans,	  and	  even	  an	  adtude	  to	  consider	  reconstrucDon	  and	  development	  as	  
two	  interconnected	  phases,	  with	  no	  clear	  border	  disDnguishing	  one	  from	  the	  other.
